ISO/IEC 27002:2022/Organizational controls/12 of 93
5.12Classification of information
Control family: Organizational controls
Control description
Control type: #Preventive
Information security properties: #Confidentiality #Integrity #Availability
Cybersecurity concepts: #Identify
Operational capabilities: #Information_protection
Security domains: #Protection #Defence
Control:
Information should be classified according to the information security needs of the organization based on confidentiality, integrity, availability and relevant interested party requirements.
Purpose:
To ensure identification and understanding of protection needs of information in accordance with its importance to the organization.
Guidance:
The organization should establish a topic-specific policy on information classification and communicate it to all relevant interested parties.
The organization should take into account requirements for confidentiality, integrity and availability in the classification scheme.
Classifications and associated protective controls for information should take account of business needs for sharing or restricting information, for protecting integrity of information and for assuring availability, as well as legal requirements concerning the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the information. Assets other than information can also be classified in compliance with classification of information, which is stored in, processed by or otherwise handled or protected by the asset.
Owners of information should be accountable for their classification.
The classification scheme should include conventions for classification and criteria for review of the classification over time. Results of classification should be updated in accordance with changes of the value, sensitivity and criticality of information through their life cycle.
The scheme should be aligned to the topic-specific policy on access control (see 5.1) and should be able to address specific business needs of the organization.
The classification can be determined by the level of impact that the information's compromise would have for the organization. Each level defined in the scheme should be given a name that makes sense in the context of the classification scheme’s application.
The scheme should be consistent across the whole organization and included in its procedures so that everyone classifies information and applicable other associated assets in the same way. In this manner, everyone has a common understanding of protection requirements and applies appropriate protection.
The classification scheme used within the organization can be different from the schemes used by other organizations, even if the names for levels are similar. In addition, information moving between organizations can vary in classification depending on its context in each organization, even if their classification schemes are identical. Therefore, agreements with other organizations that include information sharing should include procedures to identify the classification of that information and to interpret the classification levels from other organizations. Correspondence between different schemes can be determined by looking for equivalence in the associated handling and protection methods.
Other information:
Classification provides people who deal with information with a concise indication of how to handle and protect it. Creating groups of information with similar protection needs and specifying information security procedures that apply to all the information in each group facilitates this. This approach reduces the need for case-by-case risk assessment and custom design of controls.
Information can cease to be sensitive or critical after a certain period of time. For example, when the information has been made public, it no longer has confidentiality requirements but can still require protection for its integrity and availability properties. These aspects should be taken into account, as over-classification can lead to the implementation of unnecessary controls resulting in additional expense or, on the contrary, under-classification can lead to insufficient controls to protect the information from compromise.
As an example, an information confidentiality classification scheme can be based on four levels as follows:
a) disclosure causes no harm;
b) disclosure causes minor reputational damage or minor operational impact;
c) disclosure has a significant short-term impact on operations or business objectives;
d) disclosure has a serious impact on long term business objectives or puts the survival of the organization at risk.